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Learning, Concept Acquisition and Psychological Essentialism 
 
M.J. Cain 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In this article I will evaluate the popular view that we acquire most of our concepts by 
means of learning. I will do this through an examination of Jerry Fodor’s dissenting 
views and those of some of his most persistent and significant critics. Although I will 
be critical of Fodor’s central claim that it is impossible to learn a concept, I will 
ultimately conclude that we should be more sceptical than is normal about the power 
of learning when it comes to concept acquisition, particularly with respect to natural 
kind concepts.  Central to my argument for this conclusion will be an examination of 
the bearings of psychological essentialism on concept acquisition.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
How do we acquire the concepts that we use to think? According to the most popular 
answer to this question in contemporary philosophy and cognitive science we learn 
most of our concepts. Such is the popularity of this answer that it is even endorsed by 
many who are generally quite nativist in orientation.1 One persistant voice of dissent 
1 For example, Margolis (1998), Laurence and Margolis (2002), Margolis and Laurence (2011), 
Jackendoff (1989),  Pinker (2007), and Carey (2009). 
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has been provided by Jerry Fodor. In this article I will evaluate the orthodox pro-
learning view of concept acquisition through an examination of  Fodor’s  reflections  
and those of some of his most persistent and significant critics.   Although I will be 
critical of Fodor’s central claim that it is impossible to learn a concept, I will 
ultimately conclude that we should be more sceptical than is normal about the power 
of learning when it comes to concept acquisition, particularly with respect to natural 
kind concepts.   
Before turning directly to Fodor’s views it is worth noting  three points relating to 
the orthodox view. The first is that champions of the orthodox view of concept 
acquisition typically conceive of individuals as belonging to communities whose 
members share many concepts.2 This in turn makes it possible for them to share a 
language on the assumption that what an individual means by a given word is a matter 
of what concept she uses that word to express. The second point is that champions of 
the orthodox view typically regard much of the environmental interaction involved in 
concept learning as a social phenomenon in the respect that it involves the learner 
interacting with other people.3 This interaction is based upon the would-be learner’s 
desire to acquire the very concepts that her fellows use and the desire of her fellows to 
ensure that the would-be learner acquires the very concepts that they employ. The 
third point is a corollary of the  first two: in many cases of concept learning it is not 
merely the case that a concept has been acquired on the basis of interaction with the 
outside world. In addition, the concept that is acquired is the very concept that the 
2 Jesse Prinz (2002) is clear example here as he argues that it is a condition on any good theory of 
concepts that it explains the fact that we share many concepts. He calls this the desideratum of 
publicity.  
3 Sterelny (2003) constitutes a good example of this perspective. 
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learner had (however indirectly) intended to acquire or that that her fellows had 
attempted to direct her towards acquiring. Thus, there is an important respect in which 
concept learning is typically a reliable process: it reliably results in an individual 
acquiring the target concept, that is, the very concept she was aiming to acquire or her 
fellows were aiming for her to acquire. Consequently, learning ensures that members 
of a community share a common stock of concepts. 
 
2. Fodor’s classic argument against concept learning 
 
In discussing concept acquisition Fodor’s attention has focussed on lexical concepts, 
that is, concepts expressed by morphologically simple words. Following Cowie 
(1999) and Fodor (2001) we can distinguish between two types of argument against 
the view that we learn most of our lexical concepts. According to the former, it is 
impossible to learn a lexical concept so the very notion of such learning is incoherent. 
According to the latter, as a matter of empirical fact most of us never had experiences 
rich enough to facilitate the learning of our lexical concepts so we must have acquired 
them by some alternative means.4  In a number of publications Fodor (1975), (1981), 
(2001) has developed and defended an impossibility argument. The classic version of 
his argument can be expressed in the following manner: 
 
P1) Learning a concept C is an inductive process of framing and confirming a 
hypothesis of the form ‘x is a C if and only if x is an F’. 
4 Such a view of concept acquisition echoes that of the acquisition of syntactic knowledge developed 
by Chomsky (1986). 
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P2) In order to frame such a hypothesis one needs the conceptual resources to 
express the property F. 
P3) If C is a complex concept then the property F can be expressed by using a 
number of concepts each more basic than the concept C.5  
P4) However, if C is primitive then one needs to employ the concept C in order to 
express property F. The upshot of this is that with respect to primitive concepts one 
needs to have a prior grasp of the target concept in order to frame the required 
hypothesis.  
C1) It is impossible to learn a primitive concept.  
P5) The abject failure of philosophers and linguists to analyse any of our lexical 
concepts in terms of  more basic concepts suggest that most, if not all, of our lexical 
concepts are primitive. 
 C2) Most, if not all, of our lexical concepts are not learned. 
 
Those critics who have engaged with  Fodor’s argument have focussed their 
attention on different elements of it. For example, Pinker (2007) rejects P5, Samet 
and Flanagan (1989),  Mandler (2004), (2008), and Margolis and Laurence (2011) 
reject P1 and Margolis (1998), Laurence and Margolis (2002), and Weiskopf (2008) 
reject P4.  
5 For example, if C is the concept BACHELOR and being a bachelor can be analysed as being an 
unmarried adult male, then one could frame the hypothesis needed to learn BACHELOR (namely, the 
hypothesis that ‘x is a BACHERLOR if and only if  x is an unmarried adult male’) without having a 
prior grasp of BACHELOR. 
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I propose to evaluate the significance of Fodor’s argument through an examination 
of Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis’s (2002) attempt to show that it is possible to 
learn a primitive concept. I will argue that although Laurence and Margolis establish 
that it is indeed possible to learn a primitive concept, there are reasons to be sceptical 
that the learning process that they postulate actually takes place in human cognitive 
development. I will then examine Fodor’s (2008) return to the issue of concept 
acquisition in The Language of Thought 2. Here is argues that, contrary to his earlier 
view,  the position with respect to complex concepts is no different from that with 
respect to primitive concepts. I will argue that there is an element of truth in this 
claim with the upshot that my scepticism with respect to the role of learning in the 
acquisition of primitive concepts carries through to the acquisition of complex 
concepts. However, there is a potential limit to the significance of these conclusions 
as the argument for them follows both  Fodor and Laurence and Margolis in 
presupposing that concepts are symbols of the Language of Thought (LOT). This is 
potentially problematic as many cognitive scientists reject such a view of concepts. In 
the final stages of this article I address this worry by showing that my considerations 
apply just as much to pro-learning views of concept acquisition that endorse a non-
LOT view of concepts. 
 
3. Primitive concepts 
 
3.1 Laurence and Margolis on primitive concepts 
 
Margolis (1998) presents an account of how a primitive concept could be learned that 
has been developed and defended in a later article by Laurence and Margolis (2002) 
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and reiterated in Margolis and Laurence (2011). Laurence and Margolis focus on 
natural kind concepts for particulars (for example, DOG6). They argue that 
discussions of concept acquisition must  take place within the framework of a 
commitment to  a particular theory of content and the framework that they adopt is the  
atomistic theory of content  developed by Fodor (1987), (1990).7 The account that 
they develop can be described in the following terms. Acquiring a concept involves 
acquiring a sustaining mechanism, that is, a mechanism that sustains the mind-world 
causal relations involving a mental representation that are such that that mental 
representation has the appropriate content. A kind syndrome for a particular kind ‘is a 
collection of properties that is highly indicative of a kind yet accessible in perceptual 
encounters. This may include things like the typical shape, motions, markings, 
sounds, colors, etc., associated with a kind’ (2002: 38).  The sustaining mechanism 
for concepts such as DOG will include a representation of the kind syndrome. In other 
words, it will be a representational structure that carries information as to the 
perceivable properties that dogs typically have and so will be eminently learnable. 
Central to such a body of information will be shape information as dogs have a 
characteristic shape that distinguishes them form other types of animal. This body of 
information will be associated with a previously uninterpreted mental representation 
(a simple symbol of LOT for short) whose application it will drive. Thus, as the child 
gradually builds a body of information by means of learning the application of the 
representation moves closer and closer to meeting the conditions for having the 
content dog and thus being the child’s concept DOG. 
6 I am following the convention of using capitalised word to refer to concepts.  
7 Though in the latter stages of their article they argue that their approach to concept acquisition could 
equally be developed in conjunction with a causal role theory like that championed by Block (1986). 
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The centrality of the representation of shape to the sustaining mechanism for DOG 
and other related kind concepts reflects an innate bias that is fundamental to the 
learning process. This is the so-called shape bias (Soja et al, 1991) that is such that 
when learning a concept primary attention is focussed on learning the typical shape of 
items falling under the target concept and the representation of shape, though it will 
not exhaust the representation of the kind syndrome, will be central to that 
representation and thus to the sustaining mechanism. However, as Laurence and 
Margolis continue: 
 
shape by itself won’t do, nor will any combination of simple perceptual features. 
Such features aren’t a perfect guide to kind membership, since, among other 
things, the world is sometimes populated by what we’ll call fakes – objects with 
the same outward appearance of a natural kind but  which nonetheless aren’t 
instances of the category. (2002: 40) 
 
In addition, there is a second bias that constitutes a crucial element of the 
sustaining mechanism. This is the essentialist bias, the assumption made by the child 
that the items that fall under the concept are bound together by having a common 
essence. This essence is conceived as being hidden and being causally responsible for 
the perceivable  properties that belong to the kind syndrome. The essentialist bias is a 
crucial part of the sustaining mechanism for kind concepts as without it the child 
would not acquire concepts such as DOG but more general concepts that apply to 
both dogs and ‘fake dogs’, that is things that look like dogs without being dogs. In 
sum, Laurence and Margolis think that they have presented a plausible account of 
how primitive kind concepts for particulars can be learned for: 
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 Though the model requires a considerable amount of innate structure in the form 
of biases and inferential mechanisms of various sorts, [. . . ] it still looks like a 
learning model. That’s because it accounts for the acquisition of a concept which, 
in an important respect, reflects the character of one’s experience. (2002: 43) 
 
The view that children are essentialists (a view widely known as psychological 
essentialism) is prominent in contemporary developmental psychology being 
advocated by a range of scholars including Keil (1989), Gelman (2003), (2004), 
Bloom (2000), (2004), (2010), Pinker (1997) and Carey (2009). What this might be 
taken to suggest is that Laurence and Margolis are on firm empirical ground. Indeed, 
Susan Carey (2009) explicitly endorses their line of thought and states that the 
psychologist John Macnamara (1986) independently developed a very similar 
argument. However, I think that there are real problems with Laurence and Margolis’s 
account of how we acquire primitive  concepts. To say this is not to reject 
psychological essentialism but to say that their essentialist leanings do not help 
children to reliably learn concepts.  
 
3.2 Evaluating Laurence and Margolis’s argument 
 
My critique of Laurence and Margolis  will draw upon an examination of types of 
concepts that fall outside of those that they focus on, for example, kind concepts for 
stuffs. My justification for this is as follows. Laurence and Margolis’s focus on kinds 
for particulars reflected the role of a shape bias that doesn’t plausibly play a role in 
the acquisition of kind concepts for stuffs. However, there are potentially  analogous 
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biases  in relation to kind concepts for stuffs, namely, texture and colour biases.  As 
Paul Bloom puts it: ‘different properties are relevant for the adaptive categorization of 
different entities. For rigid objects, for instance, shape is highly relevant. . . . But for 
substances color and texture are what matter’ (2000: 149). Given this, along with the 
fact that many advocates of psychological essentialism think that children are 
essentialist about stuffs, it is difficult to see why Laurence and Margolis’s account 
would be viable with respect to one type of kind concept but not the other. 
Following Medin and Ortony (1989) advocates of psychological essentialism 
typically argue that children have a placeholder conception of essence; that is, they 
don’t have a concrete view of the nature of the essence in question. But could a 
commitment to essentialism play a central role in concept learning if it was so 
unspecific? Both Gelman (2003) and Carey (2009) draw an explicit comparison 
between psychological essentialism and externalist views of meaning and reference 
developed by Putnam (1975) and Kripke (1980) so it will be helpful to consider the 
issue through a discussion of Putnam’s account of how meaning is bestowed upon 
words such as ‘water’.  
According to Putnam the word ‘water’ got its meaning through a baptism 
ceremony where an individual pointed at a sample of water and thought ‘I will call 
that kind of stuff “water”’. In other words, she thought  of the sample of liquid she 
was pointing to as belonging to a natural kind and wanted to attribute to ‘water’ a 
meaning such that it applies to, and only to, instances of that kind. But she didn’t 
think anything more specific than this; for example, she didn’t think that instances of 
the kind are bound together by having a common microphysical essence. Putnam 
thinks that this was enough for the naming ceremony to succeed in bestowing the 
meaning water  on ‘water’, a meaning such that that word applies to, and only to, 
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samples of H2O. I’m not so sure. My worry here is that because the individual’s  state 
of mind was so unspecific she will not have pinned down what counts as ‘being the 
same kind of stuff’ as the sample of water she points at. And as a consequence of this 
she will not have bestowed a determinate meaning on the word ‘water’.  
It might be objected that it’s a metaphysical fact that the stuff that the individual 
interacted with  had an essence residing at the microphysical level and that that was 
enough to ensure that she attributed the meaning water to ‘water’. However, there is a 
potential problem when the individual is interacting with an item that falls under two 
distinct kinds with quite different forms of essence. Consider a sample of milk. The 
sample of milk in question will have a particular microphysical structure and 
chemistry; it will largely be H2O but will also contain various fats, proteins, minerals, 
vitamins, and the like. But its essence qua milk cannot be identified with such 
microphysical and chemical properties; something could be microphysically and 
chemically quite unlike this sample of milk whilst being milk and something could be 
microphyscially and chemically identical to the sample without being milk. To see 
this consider the following thought experiment. Suppose that a distant planet is 
inhabited by a species of super-intelligent reptiles and has never been visited by 
mammals. In their laboratories the reptiles synthesise a liquid that is microphysically 
and chemically just like cows’ milk. Would this stuff be milk? No, for the simple 
reason that it wasn’t produced naturally within the body of a mammal-like creature  
for the purpose of feeding and sustaining its young. Now consider Twin Earth. The 
twin-cows there produce a liquid in their body that they use to feed their young that is 
quite unlike cows milk at the microphysico-chemical level as it is largely made up of 
XYZ. Yet surely this stuff is milk. What this shows is that milk has a quite different 
kind of essence than water; one having to do with origins and function rather than 
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straightforward microphysical structure and chemistry. But any sample of milk will 
also be a sample of a liquid with particular microphysical and chemical properties. 
The upshot of this is that if an individual in a Putnamian naming ceremony points at a 
sample of milk and says ‘I’ll call that kind of stuff “milk”’ they haven’t thereby 
succeeded in bestowing the meaning milk on ‘milk’. This is because they haven’t 
pinned down what it is to be ‘that kind of stuff’. Is being ‘that kind of stuff’ to do with 
microphysical structure and chemistry or is it to do with origins and function? Unless 
the individual has something in her mind which settles this question then she will not 
succeed in bestowing  a determinate meaning on ‘milk’ and if she does have such an 
answer in her mind then the consequences of the naming ceremony will depend on the 
specific form that that answer takes.  
Examples with the same moral exist within the realm of words for particulars. To 
be a ‘dog’ in this sense is largely to do with being an animal that belongs to a lineage 
that has been selectively bred by humans from wolves to perform one of a range of 
functions (for example, guarding, herding, retrieving, hunting, and so on) within a 
domestic setting. Consequently, DOG isn’t a purely biological concept. Rather, it is a 
quasi-artifactual concept. Now suppose that an individual in a Putnamian naming 
ceremony encounters a domestic dog and points at it saying ‘I’ll call that kind of 
animal “dog”’. What meaning they will have bestowed upon ‘dog’ will depend upon 
the notion of essence they have in mind. If they think of ‘being that kind of animal’ as 
being a matter of belonging to the same biological kind as the animal before them 
then the meaning canine will be bestowed on ‘dog’ so that that term will apply just as 
much to foxes and wolves as it will to domestic dogs. However, if they think of the 
essence in quasi-artifictual terms, that is, as having to do with the history and role in 
human affairs then a different meaning will be bestowed upon ‘dog’. And if the 
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individual has no determinate notion of the essence in mind then no determinate 
meaning will be bestowed upon ‘dog’. 
I will now bring these points to bear on Laurence and Margolis’s account of 
concept learning. If a child is going to bring a commitment to essentialism to bear in 
acquiring a range of concepts then she needs more than a single  undifferentiated 
notion of essence. Rather, she will need to have a range of worked out notions of 
essence and make the appropriate selection of which such notion to bring to bear in 
each particular case. This is because essences of the categories for which we have 
concepts come in different forms. Some categories have microphysical essences, 
some have biological essences and some have artefactual essences, to identify three 
forms of essence. And some essences are a mixture of these things. It is not just that 
essences come in different forms but that  individual items (things or samples of stuff) 
can fall under distinct concepts each of which picks out a category with a distinct 
form of essence.  
This raises two related problems for Laurence and Margolis. First, is it really 
plausible that children have a range of distinct articulated notions of essence? For 
wouldn’t such notions of essence require them to have a grasp of a range of technical 
concepts relating to microphysical, biological and artefactual properties? And if so, 
how were those concepts acquired? Second, and more importantly, even if we were 
happy with the idea that children had such a range of notions of essence that they 
were able to employ at the age when they were acquiring concepts such as MILK and 
DOG what evidence does the child have as to which notion of essence to bring to bear 
in each particular case? What I am raising here is a poverty of the stimulus worry that 
can be developed in the following terms. 
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I have argued that MILK picks out a category that doesn’t have a microphysical 
essence and thus contrasts with WATER. We might say that the essence of milk is at 
least partly biological. If a young child is to learn the concept MILK by utilising an 
essentialist commitment then she needs to know that the category referred to in her 
community by the word ‘milk’ has a biological essence rather than a microphysical 
essence. And if she is to learn the concept WATER by utilising an essentialist bias 
then she needs to know that the category referred to in her community by ‘water’ has 
a microphysical essence. Any mistakes here will result in her acquiring the ‘wrong’ 
concept, that is, a concept at odds with that expressed by ‘water’ on the lips of most of 
her fellows. But what tells the child what the relevant form of essence is? Presumably 
children are rarely told that milk has a biological essence whereas water has a 
microphysical essence. For, as Paul Bloom points out: 
 
Even highly educated parents in university towns rarely talk to their children 
about insides and essences . . . and working-class parents are considerably less 
likely to do so. (2000: 154) 
 
Could children find out about essences less directly? I do not wish to deny that 
children receive lots of information about both ‘milk’ and ‘water’ when they are 
acquiring the corresponding concepts. But the problem that the child faces is in 
determining the significance of that information. A child may well receive plenty of 
information about the typical origins and function of the stuff her fellows call ‘milk’. 
For example: that ‘milk’ is made in the bodies of animals such as cows and humans; 
that it is the primary food source of the young of such animals; that much of the 
‘milk’ that we drink after early childhood is taken from the bodies of cows and more 
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immediately acquired from shops and supermarkets where it is packaged in cartons 
and bottles, and so on. But what tells the child which of these features of ‘milk’ are 
central to its essence and which not? What tells her that (biological) origins and 
function are central to essence but that microstructure isn’t so crucial? Similarly, the 
child will receive plenty of information about what her fellows call ‘water’ some of it 
relating to its origins and its use by biological systems. For example: ‘water’ falls as 
rain and fills rivers, lakes and seas but is made more immediately available to us 
through taps; that ‘water’  is fundamental to life in that animals and plants need to 
consume ‘water’ to survive; and so on. Much of the information about ‘water’ and 
‘milk’ that children receive is analogous in that it relates to  the respective role of 
these stuffs in human and animal life. My point is that this raises the question as to 
how children could reach different conclusions about the relevant notion of essence 
involved in each case. Why would  a child think ‘water’ has an essence that does not 
relate to its role and function in animal life when much of what she learns about 
‘water’ is that it has a crucial role and function in animal life?  And why would she 
think that the role and function of ‘milk’ in the lives of those animals that consumed it 
was central to its essence? My point is that the information freely available to children 
could just as well lead them to think that ‘water’ and ‘milk’ had comparable essences 
as that they had divergent types of essences.  Therefore, Laurence and Margolis 
haven’t presented a plausible account of a mechanism that enables children to reliably 
acquire the ‘correct’ concepts on the basis of their experiences, that is, the concepts 
possessed by the adult members of the community and expressed by the words 
‘water’, ‘milk’, and so on.  
This is not to say that children could not acquire determinate concepts on the basis 
of their experiences of milk and water. However, there would be nothing to ensure 
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that the concepts that one child acquires agrees with those of the next or with those of 
the adults whose concepts she is attempting to acquire. Similar considerations apply 
to concepts such as DOG. Recall that I argued that DOG picks out a category that 
doesn’t have a purely biological essence, that DOG is a quasi-artefactual concept. But 
children acquire plenty of other concepts for animals that are not quasi-artefactual. 
The concept RAT is an example. Now consider what a child learns about the animals 
referred to by ‘rat’ as she is acquiring the concept RAT. She learns a lot about the 
lifestyle of ‘rats’, how their history has been bound up with that of humans and of 
their role in human life. But in the case of RAT she had better not think that these 
properties to do with the role and history of ‘rats’ in human life, though highly 
significant, relate to the essence of ‘rats’. For if she does she will not acquire the 
concept RAT but some distinct quasi-artefactual concept.  But in the case of DOG she 
must think that properties relating to the history and role of ‘dogs’ in human life are 
central to their essence otherwise she won’t acquire the concept DOG but some purely 
biological concept. In short, the child would need to bring to bear distinct notions of 
essence when learning these distinct concepts and we should be sceptical that children 
typically receive information that reliably indicates which notion of essence to utilise 
in the case of which concept.  
What I have argued is that Laurence and Margolis may well be right in arguing 
against Fodor that there are certain primitive concepts that it is in principle possible to 
learn by utilising an essentialist bias. But on the basis of considering both concepts for 
stuffs such as WATER and MILK and concepts for particulars such as DOG and 
RAT,  I have argued that when we consider their account of learning in more detail 
poverty of the stimulus considerations emerge. That is, there are reasons for believing 
that children don’t generally have rich and specific enough experiences to reliably 
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learn concepts such as MILK, WATER, DOG and RAT by utilising a commitment to 
essentialism.  
A first response that might be made on behalf of Laurence and Margolis is that  all 
I have done is shown that the mechanisms they describe can’t support the reliable 
learning of concepts; that is, that they bring an element of randomness into the 
concept learning process. But, so the objection continues, learning doesn’t require 
reliability so that, for example, an individual could have learned the concept that she 
expresses by the word ‘water’ even if similar experiences would have lead some of 
her fellows to acquire a different concept. In reply to this objection I would emphasise 
the point made in section one that it is part of the orthodox view of the role of 
learning in concept acquisition that learning is, as a matter of fact, a reliable process  
that ensures that members of a community share a common stock of concepts that 
they express by means of a shared language. The upshot of this is that my argument 
implies that Laurence and Margolis’s theory of concept learning cannot be employed 
in the service of the orthodox view.  
It should also be pointed out that  Margolis and Laurence (2011) commit 
themselves to the view that the learning mechanism they postulate is reliable in 
responding to an objection delivered by Fodor. Fodor (2008) argues that even if 
learning a sustaining  mechanism is sufficient for acquiring a concept it doesn’t 
follow that the concept is learned. His worry is that there are cases where the 
sustaining mechanism that locks the acquired concept onto the property it expresses is 
irrational, incoherent or untrue. He presents the Ancient Greeks’ theory that stars are  
holes in the heavenly firmament, a theory that served to lock their concept STAR onto 
the property of being a star, as an example of such a sustaining mechanism. In such 
cases, thinks Fodor, it is an accident or fluke that learning the sustaining mechanism 
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facilitates the acquisition of the concept in question and for that reason the acquired 
concept isn’t learned. Margolis  and Laurences’s (2011) rejoinder is that the existence 
of cases such as those Fodor describes  does not establish that the problematic 
accidental element is present in all cases where the construction of a sustaining 
mechanism leads to the acquisition of a concept. For, acquiring a sustaining 
mechanism  could involve gathering correct information by means of a mechanism 
that has the function of gathering such information and reliably performs that task. 
Such a case would count as learning a concept even if the Greeks didn’t learn their 
concept STAR. The relevant point here is that Margolis and Laurence  claim that the 
concept acquisition mechanism that they postulate is typically reliable as opposed to 
random or accidental.  
A second response that might be made on behalf of Laurence and Margolis is that 
their key point is that it is possible to learn a natural kind concept and that this doesn’t 
require them to provide an account of how we actually learn such concepts. 
Consequently, my argument misses its target by being based upon a misunderstanding 
of their general goal. My response to this charge is that the issue of how we acquire 
concepts both is and should be important to Laurence and Margolis. As we have seen, 
they have done valuable work examining Fodor’s view that it is impossible to learn a 
concept. Part of their explicit motivation for carrying out such work against a general 
background of dismissive hostility to Fodor’s views in this area is that they think that 
a detailed engagement with Fodor helps to shed light on the nature of the role that 
learning plays in the human concept acquisition process. It is inconsistent with this 
approach to be unconcerned with the specifics of how we actually acquire concepts. 
Moreover, surely the important issue is how we acquire concepts and merely 
establishing that their acquisition by means of learning is in principle possible only 
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sheds limited light on this issue. For, the mere in-principle-possibility of concept 
learning doesn’t imply that we actually learn concepts. Ultimately then, the real 
interest in Laurence and Margolis’s work relates to the question of whether they have 
given us good reason to think that we humans actually learn our (natural kind) 
concepts.  
I now come to the issue of the relationship of my position to that of Fodor as it 
might be argued8 that there is little to distinguish my argument from his and that he 
would welcome my invocation of empirical considerations to bolster an anti-learning 
perspective. For, the charge continues, my point is in effect that, for example,  if a 
child does not employ the concept WATER when attempting to learn that concept 
then she will acquire a concept with an indeterminate content. This accusation is 
mistaken. The key difference between my position and Fodor’s is that I accept that it 
is possible to learn a natural kind concept such as WATER, DOG or MILK and so I 
do not endorse Fodor’s impossibility argument. In arguing against Laurence and 
Margolis I claim  that a child must bring more to her interaction with instances of the 
concepts she ultimately acquires than a generic essentialist bias. But that more 
specific something is not the target concept. For example, in learning the concept 
WATER by utilising a commitment to essentialism a child would need to employ the 
concept of a microphysical essence. Hence, if a hypothesis was being framed in this 
process it would take something like the following form:  
 
A sample of liquid is WATER if and only if it has the same microphysical 
constitution as the local liquid that falls as rain, comes out of taps, and so on. 
 
8 As it was by an anonymous referee for this journal.  
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The key concept in this hypothesis is MICROPHYSICAL STRUCTURE. This 
concept is clearly not to be identified with that of WATER and can in principle be 
used in learning a series of distinct natural kind concepts, namely those whose 
instances are bound together by sharing a common microphysical structure.  
 
4. Complex concepts 
 
4.1 The LOT2 development 
 
I now turn to the issue of complex concepts. Recall, that in his classic argument for 
concept nativism Fodor conceded that complex concepts can be learned but argued 
that most lexical concepts are in fact primitive rather than complex. However,  
in LOT2 Fodor modifies his position by rejecting the idea that complex concepts can 
be learned with the upshot that his anti-learning argument no longer relies on the 
premise that most lexical concepts are primitive.9 Hence, even if lexical concepts  
were analysable in terms of simpler concepts that wouldn’t imply that they were 
learned. Within the context of the discussion in this article, this change of heart is 
potentially very significant. For, if Fodor’s reasoning is correct then my scepticism 
with respect the role of learning in the acquisition of primitive concepts will imply 
that we should be equally sceptical about the role of learning in the acquisition of 
complex concepts. For this reason I now turn to Fodor’s new claim that it impossible 
to learn a complex concept.  
9 It is this premise that has come under substantial attack, particularly from linguists working in lexical 
semantics (Pinker, 2007; Jackendoff, 1989). 
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Fodor’s argument for the view that there is no relevant difference between the 
acquisition of primitive and complex concepts is straightforward. Suppose that  the 
target complex concept C is the concept GREEN OR TRIANGULAR. To learn this 
concept one has to frame and confirm a hypothesis of the form ‘x is a C if and only if 
it is  green or triangular’. But framing and confirming this hypothesis involves using 
the concept GREEN OR TRIANGULAR and this is clearly something that one 
cannot do unless one already has that concept. Therefore, it is impossible to learn a 
complex concept. 
Is this development in Fodor’s position to be welcomed? In the latest of their 
important series of articles criticising Fodor’s views on concept acquisition  Margolis 
and Laurence (2011) argue for a negative answer to this question and it will be 
instructive to examine their line of thought.  
 
4.2 Laurence and Margolis’s counterexample 
 
Margolis and Laurence attempt to develop a counterexample, a case of a complex 
concept that is clearly learned. An intermediate student of Scottish Country Dancing 
is attempting to learn what is involved in a particular dance known as ‘Maxwell’s 
Rant’ on the basis of watching dancers perform this dance. The dance is complex 
consisting of eight particular moves arranged in a specific order.10 The student is 
10 More specifically, Maxwell’s Rant is: 
  
a dance that involves the following sequence: reflection reels of three on opposite side, 
followed by reflection reels of three on own side, followed by crossing with right hands, 
followed by casting off, followed by half figure of eight, followed by leading down the set, 
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familiar with all these moves and has concepts for each of them. Her task is to build a 
complex representation of the constituent moves of Maxwell’s Rant and their 
ordering. Completion of this task would constitute acquiring the (complex) concept 
MAXWELL’S RANT. The question is: can this be done by means of hypothesis 
testing? Margolis  and Laurence  argue for an affirmative answer. They describe the 
point in this process where the learner has worked out seven of the eight moves and 
their ordering but is yet to determine the penultimate move. Watching another 
performance of the dance she finally identifies the penultimate step and at that point 
appreciates that she is now in a position to construct a complete and accurate 
representation of the dance. For Margolis and Laurence, what is crucial is that at  this 
point  the dancer  has done all the hypothesis testing (all the gathering and reflecting 
on evidence that she needs) but is yet to construct an explicit representation of the 
target concept. Therefore, that final step in the process of acquiring the concept comes 
after the hypothesis testing has taken place so that executing the relevant hypothesis 
testing process does not presuppose already having the target concept. Thus, in this 
case, the hypothesis testing model of concept acquisition that Fodor criticises is not 
circular. Margolis and Laurence  contend that such cases where the target complex 
concept is explicitly represented only after all the hypothesis testing has taken place 
are ubiquitous and involved in cases where the target concept is a concept ‘that 
describes a sequence of events in terms of a more basic stock of event types (e.g. 
concepts involved in learning a chess strategy, a cooking recipe, a new type of knot, 
or a chord change)’ (2011: 513).  
 
followed by casting up, followed by turning with right hands (Margolis and Laurence, 2011: 
511). 
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4.3 Responding to Laurence and Margolis 
 
I am not convinced that this is a genuine counterexample to Fodor for two reasons. 
First, exactly when did the dancer acquire the concept MAXWELL’S RANT? For 
Margolis  and Laurence to have presented a genuine counterexample it has to be the 
case that the target concept was acquired only at the point at which  the explicit 
complex representation was formed. But one might argue that the concept has been 
acquired well before then. Consider the point when the dancer identified the 
previously unknown penultimate move. At his point she has two distinct 
representations in her mind. One represents the dance as consisting of eight 
components and represents the identity of seven of those minus the penultimate move. 
And the other represents the penultimate move. In virtue of the dancer’s readiness and 
ability to integrate these representations to form a single complex representation of 
the nature of the dance I would argue that she has the concept at this point prior to 
executing any such integration.  
My second reason for doubting that Margolis and Laurence have produced a 
genuine counterexample relates to the worry that the dancer possessed the concept 
MAXWELL’S RANT prior to her beginning the process of explicitly constructing the 
complex representation that they describe. Thus, what she acquires as a result of 
observing the performances of her fellow dancers is not a new concept but  something 
else; for example, knowledge that the particular dance she has been observing is 
called ‘Maxwell’s Rant’ or that that dance is a particularly important or oft-performed 
routine in the Scottish Country Dancing  community.  
In ‘The present status of the innateness controversy’ Fodor (1981) commits 
himself to the view that both primitive concepts and the mechanisms (rules) for 
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combining them to make complex concepts are innate and so not learned. This innate 
endowment sets the limits of the concepts we are capable of thinking. Yet he goes on 
to say that it is only in a trivial sense that complex concepts are innate. The idea 
seems to be that when we explicitly token such complex concepts that counts as a 
case of having acquired them (typically by means of learning) and the point of 
acquisition is the point in time when the complex was first explicitly tokenend in the 
mind-brain. Margolis and Laurence seem to endorse this point as is indicated by the 
following quote:  
someone who encounters a black swan for the first time  is likely to form the 
concept BLACK SWAN. She  needn’t have had the concept prior to her encounter, 
and it might never have occurred to her that non-white swans are a real possibility. 
But if she has the concepts BLACK and SWAN and sees a black swan with her 
own eyes, she will come into the possession of BLACK SWAN (2011: 519). 
 
On this point I disagree with both Fodor and Margolis and Laurence: there are 
plenty of cases where  an individual possesses (and so has already acquired) a 
complex concept prior to her first explicitly tokening that complex. To see this 
consider the following. Suppose that prior to time t, though I have often thought of 
aardvarks and often thought of particular animals as being angry, I have never thought 
of anything as being an angry aardvark. Thus, I have never explicitly tokened the 
concept ANGRY AARDVARK prior to time t. At time t time I am watching a nature 
programme about aadvarks and witness some overtly grumpy behaviour and come to 
think ‘THAT’S ONE ANGRY AARDVARK’  so explicitly tokening the concept 
ANGRY AARDVARK for the first time.  
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In this context it is very important not to lose sight of Fodor and Margolis and 
Laurence’s commitment to the Language of Thought hypothesis and with it the idea 
that concepts are symbols of the LOT (words of LOT in the case of primitive concepts 
and phrases of LOT in the case of complex concepts). For a champion of LOT there is 
a strong analogy between thought  and language as viewed within the Chomskyan 
generative tradition in linguisitics. One of the key phenomena that Chomsky has been 
keen to explain is the so-called creativity of language.11  That is, the fact that we 
routinely produce and hear sentences that we have never encountered before but have 
no problems understanding these sentences and appreciating their grammaticality. 
This is explained by postulating a state of knowledge of language (an I-Language) 
that comprises of a lexicon and a battery of recursive rules or principles for 
combining  such lexical items and moving them around within complex structures.12 
Now suppose that an individual hears a particular sentence for the first time (for 
example, ‘Hedgehogs carry too many fleas to make good household pets’) and finds 
no trouble understanding it. This is a consequence of her knowledge of the relevant 
lexical items and syntactic rules of English. But it would very odd to say that the 
when the individual first hears and understands this sentence her language or her 
knowledge of the language that she speaks has expanded. She has not added a new 
sentence to her language or acquired the knowledge  that the sentence in question 
belongs to her language.  There has been no linguistic development in this case and 
therefore no learning. By parity of reasoning, assuming LOT, when an individual 
explicitly tokens a complex concept for the first time (for example ANGRY 
11 See, for example, Chomsky (2009). 
12 See Boeckx (2010) and Isac and Reiss (2013) for an accessible account of this Chomskyan 
perspective on language. 
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AARDVARK or BLACK SWAN) by drawing upon the possession of the constituent 
concepts of that complex and (her knowledge of) rules for combining simple concepts 
she doesn’t add anything to her conceptual scheme. Therefore, there has been no 
development with respect to her conceptual scheme and so no learning. To reject this 
claim is to lose sight of the analogy between language and thought within  the LOT 
perspective. 
Let’s now return to Margolis and Laurence’s example. The dancer acquires the 
concept MAXWELL’S RANT during the period of observing the dance being 
performed. The putative acquisition of this concept involves the construction of a 
complex representation that represents the elements of the dance and their ordering.  
The elements of the dance are moves for which the dancer already has concepts and in 
combining those concepts in the manner she does she employs combining 
mechanisms that she has employed many times before. This suggests that the case is 
just like that of ANGRY AARDVARK so that the dancer does not acquire the 
concept MAXWELL’S RANT at the point at which she first explicitly constructs  the 
complex representation Margolis and Lauence describe. On the contrary, she had the 
concept all along. If this is correct then Margolis and Laurence do not have a 
counterexample to Fodor at all.  
I can envisage a number of objections to this line of reasoning. The first is that the 
case of ANGRY AARDVARK is not analogous to that of MAXWELL’S RANT as in 
the latter case the explicit tokening of the concept did not come as easily as in the 
former. All I had to do was see film footage of an angry aardvark  to be prompted to 
explicitly token ANGRY AARDVARK. In contrast, the dancer had to carefully watch 
several performances of the dance and gradually build up the relevant complex 
representation. I don’t think we should be impressed by this difference. Throughout 
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the putative learning process the dancer knows that MAXWELL’S RANT is a dance 
consisting of familiar dance moves placed in a particular order. The problem she faces 
is in identifying the particular moves involved in the dances she witnesses. Thus, her 
problem relates to applying concepts that Margolis and Laurence accept that she has 
had all along. This is presumably because the dancers are moving swiftly and each 
stage of the dance  quickly merges into the next. Perhaps she wouldn’t  face such a 
problem if she watched a slow motion film of the dance.  
A second objection appeals to long-term memory and runs as follows. Once the 
complex concept that Margolis and Laurence describe has been explicitly constructed 
it can be stored in long-term memory. This facilitates the future application of the  
concept, aids  its lexicalisation, and provides a locus for building  a body of detailed 
information about the dance. This transition is significant and motivates the idea that 
for a complex concept to be genuinely possessed it has to have been explicitly 
constructed and stored in long-term memory. In response to this objection I accept 
that the transition described is significant but reject that it counts as a case of concept 
acquisition or learning. What has been acquired or learned is not a concept but 
something else; for example, a commitment to the view that a particular concept is 
significant and therefore likely to be expressed by a word, to figure in distinctive 
generalisations worth knowing, and such like.  In short, we have to be clear on what is 
learned and it is not always a concept in the cases that Margolis and Laurence 
consider.  
A further response to the objection involves pointing out that within the LOT 
model of concepts no inevitable commitment to the idea that when an individual has 
full possession of a concept there is a corresponding symbol of LOT explicitly stored 
in her long-term memory. This can be seen by considering Fodor’s view of the 
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primitive symbols of LOT that belong to an individual’s innate endowment. Suppose 
that this includes the concept DOG. Then there is a primitive symbol of LOT that is 
locked onto the property of being a dog. What this requires, to a first approximation,  
is for there to be a primitive symbol of LOT such that its tokening is caused by and 
only by dogs.13 For this to be the case, such a symbol only needs to appear in the 
mind briefly whenever the individual is impinged upon by a dog. This no more 
requires the  symbol to be stored in long-term memory than my tendency to 
experience pain when punched on the nose requires a pain to be stored in my long-
term memory. But if one accepts that one can fully possess a primitive concept 
without having a corresponding representation explicitly  stored in long-term memory 
then  it is difficult to see how one could legitimately insist that a complex concept is 
fully possessed only when it is explicitly stored in long-term memory. Recalling the 
point made in the previous paragraph, to say this is not to deny that complex concepts 
are often explicitly stored in long-term memory or that there can be cognitive value in 
doing this. Rather, the point is that such storage isn’t constitutive of possessing the 
concept but reflects the individual’s commitment to the potential significance of the 
concept in question.  
To argue that complex concepts are possessed in virtue of the possession of their 
simple components and combination rules prior to their having been explicitly 
tokened is not to imply that, within the LOT framework, the same can be said of all 
representational states. For example, consider beliefs. Suppose someone has never 
explicitly considered the proposition that hedgehogs have too many fleas to make 
good household pets and so has never tokened the LOT sentence HEDGEHOGS 
13 This view of the semantics of mental representations was developed and defended by Fodor (1987), 
(1990) drawing upon earlier work by Dretske (1981). 
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HAVE TOO MANY FLEAS TO MAKE GOOD HOUSEHOLD PETS. Nevertheless, 
in virtue of the nature of their LOT they have the capacity to token this sentence in 
forming a belief or some other type of propositional attitude. But it doesn’t follow 
from this that they actually possess the propositional attitude in question. In other 
words, in the case of propositional attitudes one has to explicitly token a relevant 
representation in order to have that attitude. The mere possession of the resources that 
would enable one to token the representation if suitably prompted is not enough.  
This difference between complex concepts and propositional attitudes is solidly 
grounded within the LOT framework. Propositional attitudes  have causal powers; 
they have a causal impact on an individual’s behaviour and her mental states. What 
explains this is that when one has a propositional attitude one tokens a sentence of 
LOT in a relevant functionally individuated component of one’s mind-brain (for 
example, in one’s belief box). But concepts in themselves don’t have causal powers 
quite the same way. It is not my possession of the concept DOG that causes me to 
token  certain mental states or behave in a particular way. Rather, it is particular 
applications of that concept in categorisation or thought that have such effects, 
applications that do involve the explicit tokening of the relevant symbol of LOT. 
My discussion of Margolis and Laurence’s putative counterexample has bearings 
on another important element of their critique of Fodor. This is their objection to his 
claim that concept learning always involves hypothesis testing. Following Fodor 
(1981), (1998) they accept that learning is a rational-causal rather than a brute-causal 
process but argue that a rational-causal process of concept acquisition need not 
involve hypothesis testing. Fodor’s mistake, they contend, is to endorse an internalist 
theory of justification. Once one countenances an externalist theory of justification 
then it becomes clear that there are three familiar means of acquiring a concept that 
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are suitably rational-causal to count as learning where the learner does not frame a 
hypothesis and then consider evidence for its truth. The first of these is perceptual 
learning as when: 
 
someone forms a new complex concept as a result of perceiving an object or 
event that manifestly exhibits the combination of properties that the concept 
picks out. For instance, someone who encounters a black swan for the first 
time  is likely to form the concept BLACK SWAN. She  needn’t have had the 
concept prior to her encounter, and it might never have occurred to her that 
non-white swans are a real possibility. But if she has the concepts BLACK 
and SWAN and sees a black with her own eyes, she will come into the 
possession of BLACK SWAN and will be prepared to record and organize  
new information about these unexpected creatures. (p. 519) 
 
As should be clear from the foregoing, I would not accept that this is a case where a 
new complex concept is acquired let alone learned. Rather, the individual’s ability to 
readily identify the creature before her as a black swan is a product of her prior grasp 
of the concept BLACK SWAN. Insofar as she learns anything it is not a concept but 
the information that there are black swans (that something actually falls in the 
extension of the concept BLACK SWAN) or that the category of black swans is a 
potentially significant one.  
The second means of learning a concept that Margolis and Laurence identify is 
communication-based learning where a concept is acquired by means of ‘verbal 
instruction and learning’ (p. 519) as when the concept of a VALID ARGUMENT is 
explained to a student. One might wonder how much the existence of this kind of 
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learning would worry Fodor as in The Language of Thought (Fodor, 1975) he noted 
that such learning does take place and that it doesn’t fit the hypothesis testing model. 
However, he seems to regard it as implausible that any more than a small number of 
our concepts are acquired in this way and on this matter he is surely correct. 
Moreover, it is arguable that the case where the concept VALID ARGUMENT is 
explained to a student is not one where she thereby acquires or learns a new concept. 
Rather, what she learns is what the expression ‘valid argument’ means and  her prior 
possession of the concept VALID ARGUMENT was indicated by her ability to 
reliably distinguish valid from invalid arguments.14 In other words, once again, we 
mustn’t lose sight of the distinction between acquiring a concept and learning which 
concept is expressed by a particular word or phrase of a public language.  
The third kind of learning is what Margolis and Laurence call ‘automatic 
associative learning’ as when a cognitive system: 
 
separately monitor[s] the environment for pairs of properties, F and G, and . . . [is] 
. . .  designed so that if it registers that a significant number of objects have both of 
these properties while few objects have only one of these properties on its own, 
then the system will form a new complex concept that encodes their conjunction (F 
& G). (p. 520) 
 
The problem here is that this no more looks like a case of acquiring a new concept 
than the case of BLACK SWAN for precisely the same reasons.  
14 In my experience the successful teaching of logic involves getting students to rigorously and 
consistently apply and represent reasoning skills they already have.  
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In sum then, Margolis and Laurence have hardly given us given us grounds to 
reject the Fodorian view that learning plays little or no role in the acquisition of 
complex concepts.  
 
5. Alternative theories of concepts 
5.1 Prototypes and proxytypes 
 
The argument that I have developed in the previous sections follows both Fodor and 
Laurence and Margolis in presupposing the view that concepts are symbols of LOT. 
But, it might be objected, this limits its significance as many cognitive scientists 
endorse alternative views of concepts. In this section I address this objection by 
examining the application of my considerations to alternative views of concepts.  
A first alternative is presented by the prototype theory. Advocates of the prototype 
theory regard concepts, in the form of prototypes, as mechanisms of classification; 
that is, they are complex representational structures that are the means by which we 
categorise objects that impinge upon us.15 A consequence of this is that concepts need 
to be explicitly tokened in the mind-brain (in the form of some physically realised 
state) if they are to do their constitutive job. Therefore, if one merely has the potential 
to construct a particular prototype in one’s mind-brain one does not thereby possess 
the corresponding concept. For Fodor, in contrast, concepts are not mechanisms for 
classification; rather, they are the representations that are explicitly tokened when 
such mechanisms are employed. It is because of this that one can have a concept as 
part of one’s conceptual repertoire whilst one is not explicitly tokening that concept 
(just as one can have a sentence as part of one’s language whilst one is not speaking 
15 This feature of the prototype theory is emphasised by both Prinz (2005) and Machery (2009). 
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or hearing it). The upshot of this is that my argument that complex concepts are 
possessed prior to their being explicitly tokened won’t work if concepts are 
prototypes. 
Moreover, if we examine the process by means of which prototypes are 
constructed I think it is clear that they are learned. To see this consider the following. 
The construction of a prototype is a process extended in time where a complex 
representation is gradually constructed by adding representations already belonging to 
the individual’s representational repertoire to a provisional representational structure 
and/ or adjusting the weightings of such elements.16 The end result is a representation 
that corresponds to a category that no simpler representation available to the 
individual at the beginning  of the construction corresponds to. Consider, for example, 
the prototype corresponding to the concept DOG. It will be constructed from 
representations that represent properties that dogs often have, such as those of being a 
quadruped, of barking, of having a tail, of being covered in fur, and so on. The 
selection of representations of these properties, as opposed to representations of 
properties that dogs never or rarely have, along with the assignment of their 
weighting, will be determined on the basis of relevant experiences, for example, those 
involving the perception of dogs. Echoing Margolis and Laurence, I would say that 
this process counts as one of learning as the construction process is sensitive to 
relevant features of the environment and gradually constructs a prototype that 
facilitates the reliable   categorisation of dogs. It is also far from clear that it is one 
where hypotheses are framed and tested. At each stage in the construction process a 
complex representation is modified on the basis of evidence as to its adequacy and by 
this means the target prototype is eventually arrived at. But it is not as if the 
16 See Murphy (2002) for a detailed account of such a process.  
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representation constructed at each stage is  floated as a tentative hypothesis with the 
explicit intention of testing it against further data that is actively gathered for that end. 
Rather, it is just that the representation is not fossilised so that it can be modified in 
the light of subsequent experiences should those experiences indicate that it is 
inadequate. The upshot of all this is prototypes  can be learned and that their learning 
need not involve hypothesis testing. 
 
5.2 Extending the argument to protoypes and proxytypes 
 
Fodor is strongly opposed to the identification of concepts with prototypes as he 
argues that prototypes, unlike concepts, do not generally compose.17 I do not wish to 
pursue this line of objection. Rather, my objection to the prototype theory is that it has 
difficulties handling natural kind concepts. These difficulties emerge when we 
examine a close relative, namely Jesse Prinz’s (2002), (2005) proxytype theory. 
For Prinz we do indeed learn concepts such as WATER. Doing so involves 
constructing a complex network of representations on the basis of experiences of 
water. This network is stored in long-term memory and is ultimately made up of 
perceptual representations. Whenever an individual employs the concept WATER an 
element of this network is activated in short term memory and so goes proxy for the 
whole network from which it is drawn. Hence, it is a proxytype. That such a proxtype 
and the larger network from which it is drawn has the content water is due to the fact 
that the latter was constructed on the basis of perceptual interactions with samples of 
water.  
17 See Fodor (1998) and Fodor and LePore (2002). 
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As both Carey (2009) and Bloom (2000) point out, the problem for the standard 
prototype theory of concepts is that they don’t do justice to the nature of the concepts 
that we actually have. Children just don’t think that falling under the concept DOG is 
merely a matter of having a statistically significant proportion of the perceivable 
properties that dogs have had in their experience. Rather, they think that falling under 
the concept DOG is something that goes beyond or behind appearance. And it is this 
that suggests that any attempt to explain how we learn those concepts that we acquire 
in early childhood is going to face a major challenge from the kind of considerations 
that I have directed at Laurence and Margolis. To see this let’s return to Prinz’s 
proxytype theory. 
Putnam’s (1975) Twin Earth thought experiment generates a problem for Prinz, 
namely that of explaining how Oscar on Earth and Twin-Oscar on Twin Earth could 
have learned divergent concepts. More specifically, how could the concept that Oscar 
comes to express by means of ‘water’ diverge in content from that that Twin-Oscar 
expresses by the same word? The problem for Prinz is that given that the 
representational structures that are stored in long-term memory from which 
proxytypes are drawn are ultimately constructed out of perceptual representations, it 
would appear  that the twins have exactly the same proxotypes and, therefore, exactly 
the same concepts. 
Prinz is alive to this problem and in addressing it he employs Locke’s distinction 
between real and nominal essences. The real essence of water (that is, the colourless, 
odourless liquid found here on Earth) is a matter of its microphysical constitution. 
The nominal essence of water is a matter of the perceivable properties characteristic 
of water on the basis of which we typically identify a sample of water as such. 
Corresponding to this distinction is that between real and nominal content. The real 
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content of the respective concepts expressed by means of ‘water’ by Oscar and Twin 
Oscar differ. This is because the stuff falling under Oscar’s concept has the real 
essence of being H2O whilst the stuff falling under Twin Oscar’s concept has the real 
essence of being XYZ. On the other hand, their concepts have the same nominal 
content as the perceptual representations that figure in the proxytypes that constitute 
their respective concepts are identical.18 In effect, what Prinz is saying is that the real 
content of a particular concept possessed by an individual  is a matter of the essence 
of the items that the individual causally interacted with in constructing that concept. 
As Oscar interacted with H2O in constructing his concept, that concept has the real 
content water. Whereas, Twin Oscar’s corresponding concept has the real content 
twin water as it was constructed on the basis of casual interactions with Twin Water.  
However, what I have said so far leaves out a crucial aspect of Prinz’s line of 
thought and this is his endorsement of psychological essentialism. Thus, with respect 
to Oscar Prinz would say that he thinks of the stuff falling under his concept WATER 
as having a particular essence (the nature of which he may well think himself  
ignorant) that is the causal basis of the perceivable properties in virtue of which he 
typically identifies a sample of water as such (that is, the properties that are 
represented by the relevant proxytype). Thus, Prinz accounts for the real content of 
Oscar (and our) concept WATER on the basis of Oscar’s  (and our) essentialist 
commitments along with the fact that that concept was constructed on the basis of 
causal interactions with H2O. Without such an essentialist commitment the concept 
Oscar and we express by means of ‘water’ would have a content such as to apply to 
18 Prinz says that his distinction between real and nominal content corresponds to the familiar one 
between broad and narrow content. 
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anything with an appearance like that of water. Thus, it would apply to XYZ as much 
as to H2O. 
It follows from my reflections on Laurence and Margolis that this way of dealing 
with the problem of accounting for the content of our concepts in the light of 
Putnam’s Twin Earth thought experiment is problematic with the upshot that Prinz 
cannot explain how Oscar and Twin Oscar can diverge in their concepts.  Given that 
the twins also acquire concepts that apply to kinds that do not have microphysical 
essences (for example, MILK) they cannot acquire concepts such as WATER or 
TWIN WATER by using an unarticulated notion of essence. Rather, they must each 
have a range of different notions of essence and apply the appropriate one in each 
particular case. For example, Oscar must apply a notion of microphysical essence 
when interacting with water and a notion of biofunctional essence when interacting 
with milk otherwise he will not acquire the concepts WATER and MILK on the basis 
of those respective interactions. But, once again, this raises the question of how Oscar 
could have acquired such notions of essence and know which to apply in each 
particular case in the absence of explicit instruction. In sum then, Prinz’s invocation 
of psychological essentialism does not help explain how the Putnamian Twins, and by 
extension us,  acquire the concepts that they acquire. Thus,  the problem that I 
directed at Laurence and Margolis is not localised to a Fodorian LOT view of 
concepts. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
Psychological essentialism implies that many of our concepts are not appearance 
concepts; rather, we think of them as picking out categories whose instances are 
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bound together by their hidden properties. Both Laurence and Margolis and Prinz 
have appealed to such essentialist commitments to explain how it is possible for us to 
learn natural kind concepts. I have argued that matters are not so straightforward. 
Although Fodor is mistaken in arguing that it is impossible to learn primitive 
concepts, a commitment to essentialism will only help us to reliably learn concepts if 
we have a range of sufficiently articulated notions of essences and that we apply the 
appropriate notion in each particular case. Given that essences come in different 
forms, a one-size-fits-all notion of essence will not enable us to acquire a full range of 
concepts including WATER, MILK, DOG and RAT. I have also expressed scepticism 
that a typical child’s experiences are rich enough to provide her with such a range of 
notions of essence or with reliable evidence as to which applies in each particular 
case.  
In the light of this what conclusion should be drawn about the role of learning in 
concept acquisition? There are three possibilities. The first is to concede that although 
we do not currently have an adequate account of how we reliably learn concepts such 
as WATER, MILK, DOG, and so on, the idea that we reliably learn such concepts is 
non-negotiable so that we should continue to search for an adequate learning theory. 
The second is to take a nativist view of such concepts seriously: perhaps concepts 
such as WATER, MILK, and DOG are part of our innate endowment. Taking this line 
involves regarding my reflections as providing a poverty of the stimulus argument for 
nativism, an argument to the effect that a typical individual’s experiences are not rich 
enough to facilitate the reliable learning of many of the concepts that she acquires so 
that those concepts must be innate if they are to be shared. To adopt such a point of 
view is not to endorse a form of nativism as radical as that championed by Fodor 
(1975), (1981). For, one could consistently argue that to view, say, WATER and 
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MILK as innate in no way commits one to the view that concepts such as 
CARBURRETOR are innate. For, it is plausible that concepts such as the latter are 
acquired on the basis of a rich battery of explicit instruction that is typically absent in 
the case of the former. The third option would be to reject both the views that 
concepts such as WATER, MILK and DOG are innate and that they are reliably 
learned. On this view we do acquire concepts on the basis of our experiences and the 
concepts that we so acquire are not innate. However, there is an accidental or random 
element involved in the concept acquisition process that is overlooked by the 
orthodox pro-learning view. For example, children attempting to learn the concept 
expressed by the word ‘water’ may well assume that the adult members of their 
community all express the same concept by means of that word and  aim to pick up 
that very concept. However, given that they are presented with impoverished evidence 
as to the nature of that concept, would-be learners are in effect forced to make leaps 
into the dark. The upshot of this is that different children make leaps in different 
directions and so acquire different concepts. Thus, many children will not have 
acquired the ‘correct’ concept and those that have will have done so by accident. In 
the absence of subsequent experiences (for, example, in the form of explicit 
instruction as to the nature of the category picked out by the target concept) to correct 
mistakes or substantiate lucky guesses, such variance in the concepts expressed by a 
given word across the community will have the result that there is no univocal 
concept expressed by that word. The upshot of this is that the very assumptions that 
underpin the orthodox view that we learn our concepts will not hold. These are the 
assumptions that concepts are widely shared across communities and that there are 
reliable mechanisms for ensuring that individuals (particularly children) being 
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inducted into a given community acquire the concepts employed by its mature 
members. 
I will not argue for any one of these conclusions in preference to its competitors  
but close by noting that all of them are noteworthy and present a challenge to the 
orthodox view of the role of learning in concept acquisition.  
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